KDD2025 August 3-7, 2025

Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY · UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME · NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY · USC University of Southern California · Duke UNIVERSITY

					
Lincan Li	Kaixiang Zhao	Kaize Ding	Yue Zhao	Yushun Dong	Neil Gong

Kaixiang Zhao, Lincan Li, Kaize Ding, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, Yue Zhao, Yushun Dong. "A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models." In 31st ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining.

Lead Speaker Introduction

Lincan Li

PhD Student (1st year), Florida State University
Reliable AI (RAI) Lab, Department of Computer Science
Advisor: Prof. Yushun Dong

Research Interests:

- Large Language Models (LLMs)
- Graph Neural Networks & Graph Learning
- Data Privacy & Security
- Spatial-Temporal Data Mining

Selected Achievements:

- Co-First Author of KDD 2025 Survey on Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses
- Lead Organizer, FSU Computer Science Student Seminar
- Main Contributor, Open-Source Projects: STG-Mamba, PyGIP
- Reviewer for NeurIPS, IJCAI, AAAI, SIGKDD, ICML, etc.
- Publications in top AI conferences & journals

Tutorial Agenda

Part 1: Background & Motivation

Part 2: Taxonomy of Attacks

Part 3: Defense Techniques

Part 4: Evaluation & Trade-offs

Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Part 6: Future Directions & Discussion

FSU FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

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Catalogue

Part 1: Background & Motivation

Large Language Models are transforming every industry



Azure OpenAI Service for Enterprise Document Intelligence





Unstructured documents

Intelligent Management

AWS Bedrock + LLM for Customer Support Automation





LLM as Traffic Control System at Urban Intersections





Disaster Mitigation
Disaster Preparedness
Disaster Response
Disaster Recovery
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability Classification
Answer Generation
Public Awareness Enhancement
Knowledge Extraction
Answer Generation
Disaster Forecast
Occurance Classification
Disaster Warning
Warning Generation
Image Generation
Evacuation Planning
Plan Generation
Disaster Identification
Relevance Classification
Disaster Situation Assessment
Situation Classification
Severity Estimation
Description Generation
Disaster Information Coordination
Usefulness Estimation
Re/Inf/Need Classification
Loc/Summary Extraction
Report Generation
Disaster Rescuing
Plan Generation
Code Generation
Disaster Issue Consultation
Answer Generation
Disaster Impact Assessment
Dam/Sent Classification
Damage Estimation
Answer Generation
Statistic Extraction
Recover Plan Generation
Plan Generation
Recover Process Tracking
Sentiment Classification
Re - Relevance
Inf - Information
Loc - Location
Dam - Damage
Sent - Sentiment
Encoder-based LLM (ELM)
Decoder-based LLM (DLM)
Multimodal LLM (MLLM)
1.6%
13.4%
72.4%
12.6%



Collecting posts related to a disaster
Classifying and localizing posts to identify issues reported by citizens
Generating detailed reports from collected user feedback
Few-shot classification
The ...
I'm ...
We ...
NER-enhanced geolocation
GenAI

The Strategic Value and Stakes of LLMs

OpenAI
deepseek
Grok
Gemini
Google



The Strategic Importance of LLMs

1. Billions of dollars are invested in building frontier language models.
2. LLMs have become core business assets and critical intellectual property.
3. The economic and societal impact of these models continues to grow.

Building a frontier LLM requires:

- Massive compute resources (GPUs/TPUs).
- Petabytes of high-quality data.
- Top research and engineering talent.

The Deployment Model: The MLaaS Paradigm



The Deployment Model: The MLaaS Paradigm

The API: A Double-Edged Sword



The API leaks behavioral clues with every query, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate users from attackers stealing the model.

What is Model Extraction?



An extraction attack attempts to copy or steal a LLM model by appropriately sampling the input space and observing outputs to build a surrogate model that behaves similarly.

Why is extraction attack a concern?



With a successful extraction attack, the attacker can perform further adversarial attacks to gain valuable information such as sensitive information or intellectual property.

Headlines: The Threat is No Longer Theoretical

How DeepSeek used distillation to train its artificial intelligence model, and what it means for companies such as OpenAI

Forbes

INNOVATION > AI

Here's How Big LLMs Teach Smaller AI Models Via Leveraging Knowledge Distillation

By Lance Eliot, Contributor. Dr. Lance B. Eliot is a world-renowned AI scien... Follow Author

DeepSeek used OpenAI's model to train its competitor using 'distillation,' White House AI czar says

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How DeepSeek used distillation to train its artificial intelligence model, and what it means for companies such as OpenAI

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

TECHNOLOGY | ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Why 'Distillation' Has Become the Scariest Word for AI Companies

DeepSeek's success learning from bigger AI models raises questions about the billions being spent on the most advanced technology



Boffins trick AI model into giving up its secrets

All it took to make an Google Edge TPU give up model hyperparameters was specific hardware, a novel attack technique … and several days

Wed 18 Dec 2024 // 15:30 UTC

Meta's powerful AI language model has leaked online — what happens now?

Meta's LLaMA model was created to help researchers but leaked on 4chan a week after it was announced. Some worry the technology will be used for harm; others say greater access will improve AI safety.

The "Strikingly Similar" Problem



(a) ICE demonstrated with real sample responses.



(b) Quantitative comparison of RSE and ICE. The reference answers for RSE are from GPT4o-0806.

[1] Lee, Sunbowen, et al. "Quantification of Large Language Model Distillation."

The "Strikingly Similar" Problem



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

(b) Quantitative comparison of RSE and ICE. The reference answers for RSE are from GPT4o-0806.

These results provide quantifiable evidence that model extraction enables the theft of a proprietary model's core identity and response style, not just its capabilities.

[1] Lee, Sunbowen, et al. "Quantification of Large Language Model Distillation."

Why Steal a Model? The Motivations

Intellectual Property Theft

1. Model Mis-Use

2. Illegal Distribution

3. Steal Private Information

Motivation 1: Model Mis-use

Definition: What is model mis-use?

Large language models can be misused when malicious users intentionally exploit their capabilities for harmful, illegal, or unethical purposes.

Typical Mis-use Scenarios



Human Resource
January 10, 2024, 10:54 AM
ATTENTION!! 2024 Acceptance Of Gratuity Policy For All Employees- Acknowledgeme...
Details
To:
Reply-To: Human Resource

AI-generated Phishing Email

Dear Colleagues,

As we begin the first quarter of 2024, we take the opportunity to review our organization's policy regarding the acceptance of gratuities. Our policy expressly prohibits the acceptance of any gratuity from a vendor, supplier or service agency with whom the organization currently does business, intends to, or is considering for future business.

Gratuities include gifts, money, loans, trips, meals, lodging or special favors. Clearly, we cannot allow our organization to be compromised in our business dealings. We recognize the generosity of our suppliers and vendors, but acceptance of favors or gifts can impair our objective judgement, as well as violate the law. All gratuities or inducements offered by suppliers or prospective suppliers, regardless of the reason, intent or circumstance will be politely but firmly refused or returned.

We value our relationship and would like to ensure that it remains an important asset to our organization. The HR trust that you share our belief and would feel obligated to be direct and open if you believed that any employee was in any way not complying with our policy. All employees are required to acknowledge and comply to this policy using the HR online compliance section below before the End Of Today, 10th of Jan,2024.

HR COMPLIANCE SECTION FOR ACCEPTANCE OF GRATUITY POLICY

Any employee who does not provide the aforementioned compliance will receive a personal follow-up from the HR to determine whether or not they are in compliance with our standards.

Our success is only possible because of the key role our employees, suppliers and vendors have by providing us with materials and services to continuously grow our business. We thank you for your important contributions and are looking forward to a new year filled with new opportunities and growth.

Thank you for your cooperation and Happy New Year!

Best Regards,
Human Resources

Generating phishing emails

Assisting in writing malware or exploit code

Producing fake news and misinformation

Motivation 1: Model Mis-use

Real-World Impact and Examples of Model Mis-Use

Potential Harms/Consequences:

- **Security risks:** Aided cyberattacks, faster malware development.
- **Societal risks:** Spread of harmful misinformation, online scams.
- **Privacy risks:** Generation of sensitive personal data, doxing.

Real-world case:

Attackers used OpenAI's GPT models to generate sophisticated new phishing emails.





Motivation 2: Illegal Distribution

Definition: What is Illegal Distribution?

Illegal distribution refers to the unauthorized sharing, selling, or leaking of proprietary language models or their outputs, violating intellectual property rights and terms of service.

Typical Illegal Distribution Scenarios

Upload or sell models on public or darknet markets



Share API keys without permission



"Shadow" SaaS platform built on stolen model

Motivation 2: Illegal Distribution

Real-World Impact and Examples of Illegal Distribution

Potential Harms/Consequences:

Economic loss for model creators and legitimate platforms.

The distributed models may **contain backdoors** or be used for **malicious purposes**.

Result in **trust crisis** for **commercial MLaaS** ecosystems.

Real-world case:

API keys for major LLM providers sold on hacking platforms.

The stolen LLM deployed by unauthorized SaaS groups

Stealing Private Information: Definition and How It Happens?

Stealing private information refers to extracting sensitive or confidential data from an LLM, often by exploiting its memorization of training data or through cleverly crafted queries.

Typical Steal Private Information Scenarios



Sensitive Data Memorization Leakage



Exposure of Proprietary or Regulated Content



Reconstruction of Training Data through Output Analysis

Motivation 3: Steal Private Information

Real-World Impact and Examples of Steal Private Information

Potential Harms/Consequences:

- Loss of **user trust and reputation damage** for service providers.
- **Legal or regulatory penalties** due to violation of data protection laws.
- Direct **harm to individuals/organizations** whose private data is exposed.

Real-world case:



LLMs unintentionally reveal credit card numbers, email addresses, or chat histories

Sensitive conversations leaked by commercial chatbot services

Part 2: Taxonomy of Model Extraction Attacks on LLMs

Proposed Taxonomy



Part 2: Model Extraction Attacks in LLMs



Model Functionality Extraction





The goal is to create a surrogate model that perfectly mimics the input-output behavior of a target model without needing internal access.

Model Functionality Extraction

Model Functionality Extraction Attack Formulation:

Surrogate model

Loss function Surrogate model

$$\underbrace{M'}_{\text{Surrogate model}} = \arg \min_{M' \in \mathcal{H}} \underbrace{\sum_{(x,y) \in D_{ext}}}_{\text{Extracted Dataset (Stolen query-response pairs)}} \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(M'(x), y)}_{\text{Measures the difference between the clone's output and the original's output}}$$

The attacker trains their clone by finding the model parameters that make its outputs as close as possible to the stolen responses from the victim model.

Sub-Type 1: API-based Knowledge Distillation

- API-based knowledge distillation transfers the over-all functionality of a target LLM by querying it with a set of inputs to create a dataset of input-output pairs.

- This dataset is then used to train a surrogate LLM that replicates the target LLM's behavior.





[1] Carlini, Nicholas, et al. "Stealing part of a production language model." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.06634* (2024).
[2] Krishna, Kalpesh, et al. "Thieves on sesame street! model extraction of bert-based apis." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.12366* (2019).

Sub-Type 2: Direct API Querying

- Different from broad knowledge distillation, direct API querying carefully crafted, strategic queries to efficiently extract specific capabilities or behaviors from the model.

Table: Comparison between API-based Knowledge Distillation and Direct API Querying

Feature	API-based Knowledge Distillation	Direct API Querying
Goal	Broad replication of the entire model's behavior. Aims to create a general-purpose clone.	Targeted extraction of specific, high-value capabilities (e.g., summarization, coding).
Query Strategy	Uses a large, diverse, and often generic set of prompts to cover a wide functional area.	Uses a smaller set of carefully crafted, strategic prompts designed to probe a narrow function efficiently.
Scope	Holistic. Attempts to capture the overall "knowledge" and response style of the teacher model.	Surgical. Focuses on specific response patterns or functionalities that are most valuable to the attacker.
Data Efficiency	Relies on quantity. Requires a massive number of query-response pairs to train the student model.	Relies on quality. Aims for maximum information gain from each query to minimize cost and detection risk.

Sub-Type 2: Direct API Querying

Modern techniques, like the imitation attack from Xu et al.[2], are so efficient the student can even surpass the teacher.

The Evolution of Query Efficiency in Extraction Attacks



[1] Yuanshun Yao,et al. 2017. Complexity vs. performance: empirical analysis of machine learning as a service. In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference.384–397.
[2] Xu, Qiongkai, et al. "Student surpasses teacher: Imitation attack for black-box NLP APIs." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.13873* (2021).

Sub-Type 3: Parameter & Architecture Recovery



This attack aims to reverse-engineer the model's internal blueprint—its parameters, weights, and architecture—rather than just cloning its external behavior.

Feature	Functionality Extraction (Types 1 & 2)	Parameter/Architecture Recovery (Type 3)
Primary Goal	Mimic Behavior: Replicate what the model *does*.	Reconstruct Internals: Reveal what the model *is*.
Target of Attack	The model's input-output mapping.	The actual model weights, architecture, and hyperparameters.
Required Information	Standard black-box API access is sufficient.	Often requires more access: side-channel info (timing, power), gradient leakage, or physical access.
Attacker's Prize	A functional surrogate model (a clone).	The model's exact blueprint or key components.

This attack is most potent in environments where the attacker has more than just standard API access, making it a threat to:

(1) Edge & IoT Devices:
Where physical access allows for side-channel attacks (power analysis, timing).



Sub-Type 3: Parameter & Architecture Recovery

This attack is most potent in environments where the attacker has more than just standard API access, making it a threat to:

(2) Distributed & Federated Learning:
Where intermediate model updates or gradients can be intercepted and exploited.





Training Data Extraction



These attacks exploit the fact that LLMs memorize parts of their training data, aiming to recover specific, often sensitive, information that the model has learned.

Training Data Extraction

Why do we include training data extraction attack in the MEA LLM paradigm?

The Facts:

- LLMs memorize part of their training data.
- Training data can be recovered via querying stolen models.



This makes training data extraction a natural outcome of model extraction.

Training Data Extraction

- Training Data Extraction
  - Prompt-based Data Recovery — Carlini et al. [7], Huang et al. [24], Wang et al. [68]
  - Private Text Reconstruction — Dai et al. [11], Parikh et al. [50], Yang et al. [83]



These attacks exploit the fact that LLMs memorize parts of their training data, aiming to recover specific, often sensitive, information that the model has learned.

Training Data Extraction

Training Data Extraction Attack Formulation:

The Similarity Function

The Similarity Threshold

$$\underbrace{E(M)}_{\text{The Extracted Set}} = \{\underbrace{d \in D_{train}}_{\text{A Point from the Training Data.}} : \underbrace{\exists p \in P}_{\text{The Attacker's Prompt.}} \quad \text{s.t. } \mathrm{sim}(M(p), d) > \tau\}$$

The attacker's goal is to craft prompts that trick the model into reproducing its original training data with high fidelity, confirming a direct privacy breach.

Sub-Type 1: Prompt-based Data Recovery

This attack exploits an LLM's tendency to memorize its training data, using carefully crafted prompts to trick the model into revealing verbatim, often sensitive, information.



Sub-Type 1: Prompt-based Data Recovery

Attackers can recover verbatim training data from LLMs using well-crafted prompts, revealing serious memorization risks in large models.(Carlini et al. [1]).



While LLMs can memorize personal information, their ability to associate the extracted information through prompts is still relatively weak, but this threat is not negligible.(Huang et al. [2]).


Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?

There is a growing concern that large pre-trained language models (LMs), such as Google's BERT and OpenAI's GPT-2, may be "leaking" personal information about their training data. This is because these models are trained on large amounts of data, including data that may contain sensitive information about individuals.

There is no definitive answer to this question at present. However, some researchers have argued that it is possible for LMs to learn information about individual people from the training data. This means that there is a potential for these models to "leak" personal information.

[1] Carlini, Nicholas, et al. "Extracting training data from large language models." *30th USENIX security symposium (USENIX Security 21)*. 2021.
[2] Huang, Jie, Hanyin Shao, and Kevin Chen-Chuan Chang. "Are large pre-trained language models leaking your personal information?." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.12628* (2022).

Sub-Type 2: Private Text Reconstruction

Private Text Reconstruction attack goes beyond verbatim recall, using inference and reconstruction techniques to recover sensitive information that the model doesn't explicitly output[1][2]



[8] Zhang, Ruisi, Seira Hidano, and Farinaz Koushanfar. "Text revealer: Private text reconstruction via model inversion attacks against transformers." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.10505* (2022).
[9] Yang, Zhou, et al. "Unveiling memorization in code models." *Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM 46th International Conference on Software Engineering*. 2024.

Sub-Type 2: Private Text Reconstruction

Table: Comparison between Prompt-based Data Recovery and Private Text Reconstruction.

Feature	**Prompt-based Data Recovery**	**Private Text Reconstruction**
Goal	Recall verbatim, memorized training examples.	Reconstruct sensitive information, even if not perfectly memorized.
Method	Crafting specific prompts to trigger memorized sequences (e.g., PII, rare text).	Inferring data from subtle patterns using advanced techniques like activation inversion or canary extraction.
Information Source	The model's direct, final output.	The model's internal states (activations) or its reaction to strategically inserted markers (canaries).
Nature of Threat	A direct privacy breach based on obvious memorization.	A more subtle and complex threat based on statistical inference and reverse-engineering.

Prompt-targeted Attacks

- **Prompt-targeted Attacks**
  - **Prompt Stealing** — **Hui et al. [26], Sha and Zhang [61], Yang et al. [82]**
  - **Prompt Reconstruction** — **Jiang et al. [29], Xu et al. [76], Zhang et al. [87]**

Why are Prompt-based attacks considered as a component of MEA for LLM paradigm?

- Prompt-based attacks aim to recover system instructions, templates, or formatting cues that guide model behavior.
- These prompts are learned representations embedded during training and crucial for model performance.
- Recovering such prompts can allow attackers to reconstruct functionalities.

Prompt-targeted Attacks

Prompt-targeted Attacks Formulation:

hidden prompt

$$\underbrace{\hat{P}}_{\text{The Reconstructed Prompt}} = \arg\max_{P} \underbrace{\{\mathrm{sim}(P, P^*)\}}_{\text{The Objective.}}$$

The attacker's goal is to reverse-engineer the hidden prompt by finding a new prompt that forces the model to produce functionally identical outputs across inputs.

Prompt-targeted Attacks

Prompt-targeted Attacks Formulation:

hidden prompt

Similarity Threshold

validation set

$$\hat{P} = \arg\max_{P}\{\text{sim}(P, P^*) : \text{sim}(M(P, x), M(P^*, x)) > \tau, \forall x \in X_{test}\}$$

The Reconstructed Prompt

The Objective.

The Black-Box Condition.

The attacker's goal is to reverse-engineer the hidden prompt by finding a new prompt that forces the model to produce functionally identical outputs across inputs.

Sub-Type 1: Prompt Stealing

Prompt stealing attacks target the valuable, proprietary prompts that represent significant commercial assets and differentiate AI applications.



Figure: Illustration of prompt stealing attack.

[1] Yuanshun Yao, et al. 2017. Complexity vs. performance: empirical analysis of machine learning as a service. In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference.384–397.
[2] Xu, Qiongkai, et al. "Student surpasses teacher: Imitation attack for black-box NLP APIs." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.13873* (2021).

Sub-Type 1: Prompt Stealing



Systematic Stealing is Possible (Sha & Zhang [1]).



Commercial Apps are Leaking (Hui et al. [2]).

[1] Sha, Zeyang, and Yang Zhang. "Prompt stealing attacks against large language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12959 (2024).
[2] Hui, Bo, et al. "Pleak: Prompt leaking attacks against large language model applications." Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
[3] Liang, Zi, et al. "Why Are My Prompts Leaked? Unraveling Prompt Extraction Threats in Customized Large Language Models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.02416 (2024).

Sub-Type 1: Prompt Stealing



Prompts Leave Detectable Traces (Liang et al. [3]).

[1] Sha, Zeyang, and Yang Zhang. "Prompt stealing attacks against large language models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12959 (2024).
[2] Hui, Bo, et al. "Pleak: Prompt leaking attacks against large language model applications." Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
[3] Liang, Zi, et al. "Why Are My Prompts Leaked? Unraveling Prompt Extraction Threats in Customized Large Language Models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.02416 (2024).

Part 3: Defense Techniques

Part 3: Model Extraction Defenses in LLMs



Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Aim: Defend models from unauthorized extraction or functional cloning.

Strategy: Maximize utility for legitimate users, minimize extraction success for attackers.

Main approaches:

1. Architectural Defense
2. Output Control

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Balancing Utility and Security.

Protected model seeks optimal trade-off:

- Maximize utility for legitimate input X_{leg}
- Minimize extraction success for adversarial input X_{adv}

Formulation:

$$\underbrace{M'}_{\text{The protected model}} = \underbrace{\arg\max_{M' \in M}}_{\text{Find the best protected model}} \{\underbrace{\overbrace{U}^{\text{Utility function}}(M', \overbrace{X_{leg}}^{\text{legitimate users}})}_{\text{Maximize utility}} - \underbrace{\overbrace{\lambda}^{\text{The trade-off parameter}} \overbrace{E}^{\text{Extraction success function}}(M', X_{adv})\}}_{\text{Minimizing the success of adversarial extractors}}$$

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Utility function

Legitimate users

Formulation: $$\underbrace{M'}_{\text{The protected model}} = \underbrace{\arg\max_{M' \in M}}_{\text{Find the best protected model}} \{\underbrace{U(M', X_{leg})}_{\text{Maximize utility}} - \lambda E(M', X_{adv})\}$$



Defense Techniques

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

The trade-off parameter

Extraction success function

Formulation: $$M' = \arg\max_{M' \in M} \{U(M', X_{leg}) - \underline{\lambda E(M', X_{adv})}\}$$

Minimizing the success of adversarial extractors

Extraction Risk

User Utility



Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Architectural Defense: Protecting Model Internals.

Security features integrated into model structure.

Examples:

- Watermarking via attention mechanisms
- Structural changes to resist extraction





Key idea: Target mechanisms that extraction attacks exploit.

[1] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "TransLinkGuard: Safeguarding Transformer Models Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*. 2024.
[2] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "CoreGuard: Safeguarding Foundational Capabilities of LLMs Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.13903* (2024).

Defense Techniques

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Architectural Defense: Case Studies & Limitations.

TransLinkGuard [1]: Embeds watermarks in attention, minimal compute overhead (good for edge devices).



[1] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "TransLinkGuard: Safeguarding Transformer Models Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*. 2024.
[2] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "CoreGuard: Safeguarding Foundational Capabilities of LLMs Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.13903* (2024).

Defense Techniques

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Architectural Defense: Case Studies & Limitations.

CoreGuard [2]: Structural tweaks to protect core functions, reduce clone utility.



[1] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "TransLinkGuard: Safeguarding Transformer Models Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*. 2024.
[2] Li, Qinfeng, et al. "CoreGuard: Safeguarding Foundational Capabilities of LLMs Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.13903* (2024).

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Output Control: Defense via Response Manipulation.

Key Idea:

- Modify model outputs to disrupt extraction.
- No need to alter model architecture.

Examples:

- **Watermark Injection**: Embed imperceptible tokens into model outputs to later trace whether a suspect model was trained on them.
- **Answer Perturbation**: Slightly alter responses (e.g., rounding numbers, rephrasing) to degrade the accuracy of extracted models without affecting human usability.



Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Output Control: Defense via Response Manipulation.

ModelShied[1] introduces an adaptive output watermarking strategy that selectively embeds imperceptible triggers into model responses, enabling robust ownership verification against extraction attacks without degrading model utility.



[1] Pang, Kaiyi, et al. "ModelShield: Adaptive and Robust Watermark against Model Extraction Attack." *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security* (2025).
[2] Wang, Liaoyaqi, and Minhao Cheng. "GuardEmb: Dynamic Watermark for Safeguarding Large Language Model Embedding Service Against Model Stealing Attack." *In EMNLP,* 2024.

Model Protection: Preventing Unauthorized Extraction

Output Control: Defense via Response Manipulation.

GuardEmb[2] introduces a dynamic embedding watermarking technique that subtly perturbs LLM-generated embeddings for texts containing special tokens, while jointly training a verifier to detect these watermarks—ensuring high detectability of model theft without sacrificing embedding utility.



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[2] Wang, Liaoyaqi, and Minhao Cheng. "GuardEmb: Dynamic Watermark for Safeguarding Large Language Model Embedding Service Against Model Stealing Attack." *In EMNLP*, 2024.

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Aim: Prevent private information from being extracted via LLMs

Strategy: Balance utility and privacy.

Main approaches:

1. Training Data Security
2. Output Sanitization

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Formulating Privacy Protection

Minimize privacy leakage L(M', P) while preserving model utility.

Formulation:

$$\underbrace{M'}_{\text{Protected model}} = \underbrace{\arg\min_{M' \in \mathcal{M}}}_{\text{Find the best protected model}} \{\underbrace{L(M', P)}_{\text{Minimizing the leakage of private data}} + \underbrace{\lambda \mathcal{D}(M', M)}_{\text{Deviating as little as possible from the original model's utility}}\}$$

λ : controls the privacy-utility trade-offs

The goal is to make the model "forget" or hide its sensitive training data without significantly compromising its overall performance and usefulness.

Defense Techniques

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Formulating Privacy Protection

Formulation:

Privacy Leakage Function

The trade-off parameter

Utility Deviation Function

$$\underbrace{M'}_{\text{Protected model}} = \underbrace{\arg\min_{M' \in \mathcal{M}}}_{\text{Find the best protected model}} \{\underbrace{L(M', P)}_{\text{Minimizing the leakage of private data}} + \underbrace{\lambda \mathcal{D}(M', M)}_{\text{Deviating as little as possible from the original model's utility}}\}$$

λ : controls the privacy-utility trade-offs

Leakage

Utility

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Training Data Security: Defending Model Memory.

Goal: Prevent memorization and extraction of sensitive training data.

Methods:
- Differential Privacy
- Selective knowledge deletion
- Both preemptive and corrective protection needed



[1] Feng, Shanglun, and Florian Tramèr. "Privacy backdoors: stealing data with corrupted pretrained models." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.00473* (2024).
[2] Patil, Vaidehi, Peter Hase, and Mohit Bansal. "Can sensitive information be deleted from llms? objectives for defending against extraction attacks." arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.17410 (2023).

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Training Data Security: Defending Model Memory.

[1] proposes enhanced model editing objectives that directly delete sensitive information from both the output and intermediate hidden states of large language models. The proposed method makes it significantly harder for attackers to extract memorized facts by targeting both surface and latent model memories.



[1] Patil, Vaidehi, Peter Hase, and Mohit Bansal. "Can sensitive information be deleted from llms? objectives for defending against extraction attacks." arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.17410 (2023).

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Challenges in Training Data Security.

a) Blanket protection (e.g., classic DP) often harms utility.

b) Targeted protection for specific data types is more effective.

c) Models inherently memorize training examples.

Advances in Training Data Security.

New training methods to limit harmful memorization.

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Output Sanitization: Filtering Private Info at Inference.

Goal:

Prevent the leakage of sensitive, private, or harmful information by systematically controlling and filtering the outputs of LLMs, regardless of what is memorized internally.



Methods:

- **Output Filtering with Safeguards:**
  Deploy external models or rule-based filters that monitor and sanitize the outputs of the LLM before they are delivered to users.
- **Internal Output Review/Tagging:**
  Train the LLM itself to self-check its generated responses for harmful or sensitive content and automtically tag each output as "[harmless]" or "[harmful]".

[1] Li, Qinbin, et al. "Llm-pbe: Assessing data privacy in large language models." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.12787* (2024).
[2] Wang, Zezhong, et al. "SELF-GUARD: Empower the LLM to Safeguard Itself." *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. 2024.

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Output Sanitization: Filtering Private Info at Inference.

LLM-PBE[1] is a comprehensive benchmarking toolkit that systematically evaluates both attack and defense strategies, including output sanitization techniques such as data scrubbing and defensive prompting, in order to mitigate training data leakage and enhance privacy protection in LLMs.



[1] Li, Qinbin, et al. "Llm-pbe: Assessing data privacy in large language models." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.12787* (2024).
[2] Wang, Zezhong, et al. "SELF-GUARD: Empower the LLM to Safeguard Itself." *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. 2024.

Data Privacy Protection: Limiting Privacy Leakage in LLMs

Output Sanitization: Filtering Private Info at Inference.

SELF-GUARD[2] proposes an output sanitization method that empowers the LLM to self-assess its own responses for harmful or private content at inference time, by automatically appending a harmless/harmful tag to each output and using a lightweight filter to block risky content. This approach combines the advantages of internal safety training and external safeguards, resulting in a robust and low-overhead defense.



[1] Li, Qinbin, et al. "Llm-pbe: Assessing data privacy in large language models." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.12787* (2024).
[2] Wang, Zezhong, et al. "SELF-GUARD: Empower the LLM to Safeguard Itself." *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. 2024.

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Aim:

(1) Safeguard proprietary prompts & instruction patterns.

(2) Detect and prevent unauthorized prompt use.

Main approaches:

1. Direct Prompt Protection
2. Query Monitoring



Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Balancing Security and Functionality.

Objective:
Maximize detection of unauthorized use, minimize impact on normal queries.

Formulation: Detection system Private prompt The trade-off parameter

$$\arg\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \{\mathrm{TPR}(D, P, X_{adv}) - \lambda \mathrm{Impact}(D, P, X_{leg})\}$$

- TPR: True Positive Rate of Detecting Attacks.
- λ : Adjusts security–usability trade-off

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Balancing Security and Functionality.

Detection system

Private prompt

The trade-off parameter

$$\underbrace{\arg\max_{D\in\mathcal{D}}}_{\text{Find the best defense system}}\{\underbrace{\mathrm{TPR}(D, P, X_{adv})}_{\text{Maximizing the detection of prompt stealing}} - \underbrace{\lambda \mathrm{Impact}(D, P, X_{leg})}_{\text{Minimizing the negative impact of legitimate functionality}}\},$$

The goal is to build a robust security system that effectively catches prompt thieves without getting in the way of legitimate users.

Defense Techniques

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Direct Prompt Protection: Watermarking & Obfuscation.

Goals:

- Prevent prompt theft or misuse.



- Enable traceability of model outputs.



Methods:

- **Conditional Watermark:** Embed unique, invisible watermarks or trigger patterns within the model's responses when specific protected prompts are detected during inference (e.g., CATER conditional watermarking).

- **Prompt Detection and Filtering:** At the identification stage, analyze the outputs of suspicious models to check for these watermarks, enabling the detection of prompt misuse or intellectual property theft.

[1] He, Xuanli, et al. "Cater: Intellectual property protection on text generation apis via conditional watermarks." *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 35: 5431-5445.
[2] Kim, Minjae, et al. "Protection of LLM Environment Using Prompt Security." 2024 15th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC).

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Direct Prompt Protection: Watermarking & Obfuscation.

CATER[1] is a conditional watermarking framework that stealthily embeds ownership signals into text generation APIs by leveraging high-order linguistic features, enabling robust and hard-to-detect IP protection against model extraction and imitation attacks with minimal impact on output quality.



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Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Direct Prompt Protection: Watermarking & Obfuscation.

[2] presents a prompt detection system that proactively protects LLMs by scanning and filtering both user prompts and model outputs for personally identifiable information (PII), malicious code, URLs, and prompt injection attempts, leveraging regular expressions and fine-tuned LLM classifiers to defend against prompt-based model extraction and misuse.





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Defense Techniques

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Query Monitoring: Detecting Suspicious Activity

Goals:

(a) Detect & Flag Malicious Queries.



(b) Protect IP via Behavioral Anomaly Detection.



Methods:

- Sequential query analysis: detect multi-step or hidden attacks.
- Internal Behavior Monitoring: Track model activations to flag adversarial patterns.
- Lightweight Detectors: Enable real-time, scalable monitoring.

[1] Yueh-Han, Chen, et al. "Monitoring Decomposition Attacks in LLMs with Lightweight Sequential Monitors." ArXiv preprint arXiv:2506.10949 (2025).
[2] Zhang, Mengdi, et al. "LLMScan: Causal Scan for LLM Misbehavior Detection." ArXiv preprint arXiv:2410.16638 (2024).

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Query Monitoring: Detecting Suspicious Activity

[1] introduces a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that tracks and analyzes the sequence of user queries to large language models, enabling real-time detection of decomposition attacks and hidden malicious intentions by aggregating information across multiple queries—offering robust query monitoring defense beyond single-step detection.



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Defense Techniques

Prompt Protection: Securing Instructional in LLMs

Query Monitoring: Detecting Suspicious Activity

LLMScan[2] is a novel query monitoring method that detects model extraction and other malicious behaviors by performing real-time causality analysis on internal token and layer activations in response to each user query, enabling the system to identify abnormal model behavior before harmful outputs are generated.



[1] Yueh-Han, Chen, et al. "Monitoring Decomposition Attacks in LLMs with Lightweight Sequential Monitors." arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.10949 (2025).
[2] Zhang, Mengdi, et al. "LLMScan: Causal Scan for LLM Misbehavior Detection." arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.16638 (2024).

Break

15-Minute Break

Part 4: Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Measures



Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Why systematic evaluation is crucial?

- ✓ Lack of standard evaluation leads to inconsistent/misleading comparisons across studies.
- ✓ Standardized metrics is difficult to measure this rapid evolving field.
- ✓ Systematic evaluation help us identify how robust and generalizable it is across different tasks/settings.

Why metrics must assess both attack and defense?

✓ From attack perspective:
How successfully a stolen model mimics the original?

✓ From defense perspective:
Whether an attack is prevented? At what cost?

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Evaluating Extraction Attacks: Main Dimensions

(1) How well does the stolen model copy the target's behavior?

(2) How much sensitive data is exposed?

(3) How stealthy & cost-effective is the attack?

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

(1) How well does the stolen model copy the target's behavior?

a) **Agreement Rate:** The percentage where extracted and target models produce equivalent outputs given identical inputs.

b) **Behavioral Consistency:** How reliably an extracted model reproduces specific patterns of the target model.

c) **Task Specific Performance:** Alignment between extracted and target models on standardized benchmarks.

d) **Perplexity Similarity:** A continuous measure of functional extraction success by comparing cross-perplexity between models.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

a) **Agreement Rate:** The percentage where extracted and target models produce equivalent outputs given identical inputs.

$$\text{Agreement Rate} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} 1[y_i = \hat{y}_i]$$

N: total number of input samples.
y_i: Output of the target model for the i-th input.
$\hat{y}_i$: Output of the extracted model for the i-th input.
$1[\cdot]$: Indicator function, returning 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

A calculation case for Agreement Rate:

Suppose we evaluate both the target and extracted models on 5 input samples. Their predictions are as follows:

Input ID	Target Model Output	Extracted Model Output	Match?
1	"Yes"	"Yes"	✅
2	"No"	"No"	✅
3	"Yes"	"No"	❌
4	"No"	"No"	✅
5	"Yes"	"Yes"	✅

$$\text{Agreement Rate} = \frac{4}{5} = 0.8$$

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

b) Behavioral Consistency: How reliably an extracted model reproduces specific patterns of the target model.

$$\text{Behavioral Consistency} = \frac{1}{|P|} \sum_{p \in P} sim(\mathcal{B}(p), \hat{\mathcal{B}}(p))$$

P: A set of probing inputs carefully selected to reflect diverse functional behaviors of the target model.
$\mathcal{B}(p)$: The behavioral signature (e.g., probability distribution, hidden states, or logits) of the target model on input p.
$\hat{\mathcal{B}}(p)$: The corresponding signature of the extracted model on the same input.
$sim(\cdot, \cdot)$: A similarity function, such as cosine similarity or KL-divergence.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

A calculation case for Behavioral Consistency:

Assume we use a small probing set ***P*** with 3 inputs. We compare the output probability vectors from both models using cosine similarity:

Input *p*	**Target Output** $\mathcal{B}(p)$	**Extracted Output** $\hat{\mathcal{B}}(p)$	**Cosine Similarity**
p_1	[0.7, 0.2, 0.1]	[0.68, 0.22, 0.10]	0.998
p_2	[0.1, 0.6, 0.3]	[0.15, 0.55, 0.30]	0.985
p_3	[0.4, 0.4, 0.2]	[0.45, 0.35, 0.20]	0.993

$$\text{Behavioral Consistency} = \frac{1}{3}(0.998 + 0.985 + 0.993) = 0.992$$

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

c) Task Specific Performance: Alignment between extracted and target models on standardized benchmarks.

$$\text{Task Specific Performance} = \frac{1}{|T|}\sum_{t\in T}|M(t) - \hat{M}(t)|,$$

or equivalently, for accuracy-based tasks:

$$\text{TSP}_{gap} = |\mathbf{Acc} - \hat{\mathbf{Acc}}|$$

T: A set of downstream benchmark tasks (e.g., node classification, link prediction, graph classification, etc)
M(t): The target model's performance on task t (e.g., accuracy, F1, etc)
$\hat{M}(t)$: The extracted model's performance on task t.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

d) Perplexity Similarity: A continuous measure of functional extraction success by comparing cross-perplexity between models.

Let D be a set of evaluation sentences. The perplexity of model M on a sequence $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n)$ is defined as:

$$\mathrm{PPL}_M(x) = \exp\left(-\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \log P_M(x_i | x_{<i})\right)$$

Then the Perplexity Similarity between two models is measured using either absolute difference or relative ratio:

$$\text{Perplexity Gap} = |PPL_M(D) - PPL_{\hat{M}(D)}|$$

(Absolute difference)

$$\text{Perplexity Ratio} = \frac{PPL_{\hat{M}}(D)}{PPL_M(D)}$$

(Relative difference)

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Functional Similarity Metrics: Measure Copy Success

d) Perplexity Similarity: A continuous measure of functional extraction success by comparing cross-perplexity between models.

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(Absolute difference)

$$\text{Perplexity Ratio} = \frac{PPL_{\hat{M}}(D)}{PPL_M(D)}$$

(Relative difference)

- A lower gap or a ratio close to 1 means the extracted model behaves similarly to the target model in how it predicts next tokens.
- A high gap or large deviation in ratio implies the models diverge significantly in their internal distributional behavior.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

(2) How much sensitive data is exposed?

a) **Training Data Extraction Rate:** % of training data recovered.

b) **Precision & Recall:** Accuracy and completeness for structured data.

c) **PII Exposure Rate:** Sensitive user/private info leakage.

d) **Prompt Recovery Accuracy:** Can system prompts be reconstructed?

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

a) Training Data Extraction Rate: % of training data recovered.

$$TDER = \frac{|\hat{D} \cap D|}{D} \times 100\%$$

D: Set of all training data samples.
$\hat{D}$: Set of samples recovered (extracted) by the adversary.
$|\hat{D} \cap D|$: Number of correctly extracted training samples.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

a) Training Data Extraction Rate: % of training data recovered.

Suppose:

The model was trained on |D|=100,000 sentences.

The attacker extracts a set $\hat{D}$ containing 2,000 sentences. Among them, 850 sentences match the original training set exactly.

$$TDER = \frac{850}{100,000} \times 100\% = 0.85\%$$

A TDER of 0.85% means <u>0.85% of the training data was directly leaked</u>, which is a potentially concern if the leaked data includes sensitive or proprietary information.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

b) Precision & Recall:

- **Precision** measures the proportion of correctly extracted items out of all extracted items.
- **Recall** measures the proportion of correctly extracted items out of all the true sensitive items.

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{|\hat{D} \cap D|}{\hat{D}} \qquad \text{Recall} = \frac{|\hat{D} \cap D|}{|D|}$$

D: Set of ground-truth sensitive or structured data in the training set;
$\hat{D}$: Set of data extracted by the attacker;
$\hat{D} \cap D$: Correctly extracted data.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

b) Precision & Recall:

Suppose:

- Ground-truth sensitive data D includes 200 known email address used during LLM training.
- An attacker extracts a total of 50 email addresses $|\hat{D}| = 50$.
- Out of those, 30 match the original training emails $|\hat{D} \cap D| = 30$.

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{30}{50} = 0.6$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{30}{200} = 0.15$$

The attacker is reasonably accurate (60% of their outputs are valid), but has low coverage (only found 15% of all sensitive emails).

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

c) PII (Personally Identifiable Information) Exposure Rate:

PII quantifies how much sensitive personal information (such as names, email addresses, phone numbers, or social security numbers) has been leaked or reconstructed from an LLM through model extraction attacks.

$$\text{PII Exposure Rate} = \frac{\hat{P} \cap P}{|P|}$$

$\boldsymbol{P}$: The total set of PII elements present in the model's original training data.
$\hat{P}$: The set of PII elements extracted by the adversary.
$\hat{P} \cap P$: The number of PII items that were both in the training set and successfully extracted by the attacker.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

c) PII (Personally Identifiable Information) Exposure Rate:

Suppose:

- The training dataset contains 1000 pieces of real PII (e.g., user name, phone numbers, email address, etc), so that |P|=1000.
- An attacker successfully extracts 120 strings that resembles PII, with 45 strings match exactly with real training data, so $|\hat{P} \cap P| = 45$.

$$\text{PII Exposure Rate} = \frac{45}{1000} = 4.5\%$$

4.5% of the original PII from training data has been exposed. Even small exposure rates can have serious privacy implications depending on the nature of the data.

Evaluation Measures

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

d) Prompt Recovery Accuracy: It quantifies how accurately an attacker can reconstruct the original system prompts or instructions used to guide a model's behavior. These prompts often encode sensitive logic, task instructions, or safety constraints.

$$\text{Prompt Recovery Accuracy} = \frac{|\hat{S} \cap S|}{|S|}$$

S: The set of original system prompts or instructions embedded in the target model.
$\hat{S}$: The set of prompts recovered or reconstructed by the attacker.
$\hat{S} \cap S$: The correctly recovered prompts that match the true underlying instructions.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Data Recovery Metrics: Quantifying Info Leakage

d) Prompt Recovery Accuracy:

Suppose:

- The target model internally uses 10 system prompts for task-specific control (e.g., "Be concise", "Avoid political topics, etc"), so $|S|=10$.
- After performing a model inversion attack, the adversary reconstructs 6 system prompts, 4 of which are correct and match original ones, i.e., $|\hat{S} \cap S| = 4$

Then,

$$\text{Prompt Recovery Accuracy} = \frac{4}{10} = 40\%$$

The attacker successfully recovered 40% of the system instructions.
This suggests a partial but significant breach of the model's design or internal safety logic.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

(3) How stealthy & cost-effective is the attack?

a) The Effectiveness of common defense mechanisms on Functionality Extraction

b) The Effectiveness of common defense mechanisms on Training Data Extraction

c) The Effectiveness of common defense mechanisms on Prompt-Targeted Attacks

d) Defense Utility: Preserving Model Value

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Defense Effectiveness Overview

Table: Defense Mechanisms vs. Attack Types

Defense Mechanism	Functionality Extraction			Training Data Extraction		Prompt-targeted Attacks	
	API-based KD	Direct API Querying	Parameter Recovery	Prompt-targeted Recovery	Private Text Reconstruction	Prompt Stealing	Prompt Reconstruction
Architectural Defense [1]	High	Medium	High	Low	Low	Minimal	Minimal
Output Control [2]	High	High	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
Training Data Security [3]	Low	Minimal	Minimal	High	High	Minimal	Minimal
Output Sanitization [4]	Low	Low	Minimal	High	High	Low	Low
Prompt Protection [5]	Minimal	Low	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	High	High
Query Monitoring [6]	Medium	High	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium

Effectiveness Levels: High (dark green) - Highly effective; Medium (light green) - Moderately effective; Low (yellow) - Limited effectiveness; Minimal (gray) - Minimal or no effectiveness.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Defense Effectiveness Overview

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Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Defense Effectiveness Overview

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Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Defense Utility: Preserving Model Value



(1) Performance Preservation:
Minimal impact on intended tasks.



(2) Response Quality:
Maintains generation fluency.



(3) Computation Overhead:
Extra resource cost.



(4) False Positive Rate:
Legitimate queries wrongly blocked.

Evaluation Metrics for Model Extraction Attacks & Defenses

Open Challenges in Evaluation

1) No single metric fits all attack/defense types.

2) Balancing security and usability is hard.

3) Evaluations often empirical, need formal benchmarks.

Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Case1: Model Leeching: An Extraction Attack Targeting LLMs

Extracting ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo with just $50 API cost?

Key findings:

- 73% answer similarity (Exact Match)
- F1 score up to 87%
- Extracted model enables new attacks on LLMs

[1] Birch, Lewis, et al. "Model leeching: An extraction attack targeting llms." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10544* (2023).

Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Case1: Model Leeching: An Extraction Attack Targeting LLMs

Black-box extraction: Only need public API access, no model details required

Extracting ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo with just $50 API cost?

Attack Pipeline

Prompt Design → Data Generation → Model Training → Adversarial Attack Staging

[1] Birch, Lewis, et al. "Model leeching: An extraction attack targeting llms." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10544* (2023).

Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Case1: Model Leeching: An Extraction Attack Targeting LLMs

Extraction Methodology: Prompting, Labeling, and Model Training

Tasks: Question Answering on SQuAD dataset.

SQuAD2.0
The Stanford Question Answering Dataset





- Automated prompt generation to label 83,335 examples.
- Extracted model trained on ChatGPT-labeled data.
- Total cost: $50.
- Duration: 48hours.

[1] Birch, Lewis, et al. "Model leeching: An extraction attack targeting llms." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10544* (2023).

Case1: Model Leeching: An Extraction Attack Targeting LLMs

Attack Results & Transferability



Fig (a): Model Similarity to ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo. Comparing similarity in correct and incorrect answering of questions relative to ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo.



Fig (b): Baseline and Extracted SQuAD Accuracy. Comparing the baseline and extracted models' performance on the original SQuAD dataset questions and answers.

[1] Birch, Lewis, et al. "Model leeching: An extraction attack targeting llms." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10544* (2023).

Case1: Model Leeching: An Extraction Attack Targeting LLMs

Why is this important?

- **Low-cost extraction** enables model cloning at scale.
- **Attack transferability**: Stolen models can be used to design new attacks.
- **LLMs served via public APIs are at significant risk.**
- Need for stronger model Intellectual Property protection methods.

[1] Birch, Lewis, et al. "Model leeching: An extraction attack targeting llms." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10544* (2023).

Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Case 2: Zero-Click LLM Attack: EchoLeak in Microsoft 365 Copilot

- Discovered in Jan 2025 by AimLabs.
- Named EchoLeak, CVE-2025-32711 (CVSS 9.3).
- Allowing silent data exfiltration - NO user interactions required.



[1] Zero-Click AI Vulnerability Exposes Microsoft 365 Copilot Data Without User Interaction. https://thehackernews.com/2025/06/zero-click-ai-vulnerability-exposes.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Case 2: Zero-Click LLM Attack: EchoLeak in Microsoft 365 Copilot

STEP1: Attacker sends a crafted email with hidden prompt injection.

STEP2: Copilot (via RAG) retrieves chunks including malicious payload.

STEP3: Model processes and leaks context data silently.

STEP4: Exfiltration happens automatically via Teams/SharePoint links.

[1] Zero-Click AI Vulnerability Exposes Microsoft 365 Copilot Data Without User Interaction. https://thehackernews.com/2025/06/zero-click-ai-vulnerability-exposes.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Case 2: Zero-Click LLM Attack: EchoLeak in Microsoft 365 Copilot

Key Technical Insights

LLM Scope Violation

What it is: Untrusted email instructions trigger LLM to access privileged data.

Why it works: RAG engine lacks trust segmentation, it treats malicious content as context.

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Case 2: Zero-Click LLM Attack: EchoLeak in Microsoft 365 Copilot

Key Takeaways & Mitigations

Defenses	Key Takeaways
Patch Copilot (completed June 2025)	Trust boundaries must cover RAG inputs
Restrict external email ingestion (DLP tags)	LLM agents need least-privilege design
Harden prompt and context sanitization (LLM Scope Violation guardrails)	Zero-click attacks are now real threat

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Case 3: DeepSeek vs OpenAI: Unintended Model Distillation

OpenAI 'reviewing' allegations that its AI models were used to make DeepSeek

ChatGPT creator warns Chinese startups are 'constantly' using its technology to develop competing products

OpenAI, the developer of ChatGPT, said it knew China-based firms, and others, 'are constantly trying to distil the models of leading US AI companies'. Photograph: GK Images/Alamy

OpenAI has warned that Chinese startups are "constantly" using its technology to develop competing products and said it is "reviewing" allegations that DeepSeek used the ChatGPT maker's AI models to create a rival chatbot.

OpenAI and its partner Microsoft - which has invested $13bn in the San Francisco-based AI developer - have been investigating whether proprietary technology had been obtained in an unauthorised manner through a technique known as "distillation".

- AI startup DeepSeek reportedly used knowledge distillation on OpenAI's GPT models to build its R1 chatbot.
- Released in January 2025, R1 quickly topped Apple's free app rankings.
- Allegations: model and functionality closely mirror OpenAI's GPT-like capabilities.



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Case 3: DeepSeek vs OpenAI: Unintended Model Distillation

How is Distillation Allegedly Performed?

- DeepSeek trained their model using OpenAI API in a black-box manner.
- Technique:

Generate synthetic outputs via prompts → Fine-tune on these pairs (”Model Distillation”)

Timeline Highlight:

1) Early 2025: R1 released.
2) January 2025: OpenAI issues letter alleging unauthorized distillation.

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Case 3: DeepSeek vs OpenAI: Unintended Model Distillation

OpenAI & Government Response

OpenAI's Stance:

(1) Investigating "indications" of unauthorized distillation from GPT.
(2) Reported evidence and collaborating with US government.

Regulatory Impact:

(1) US Navy banned DeepSeek usage.
(2) Added to US tech scrutiny amid rising security concerns.

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Case 3: DeepSeek vs OpenAI: Unintended Model Distillation

Why This Matters?

- **Intellectual Property Theft Risk**

- **Model Development Cost**

DeepSeek R1 <$6M

V.S.

GPT-4's >$100M

- **Market disruption**

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Case 3: DeepSeek vs OpenAI: Unintended Model Distillation

Key Takeaways & Mitigations

Lessons Learned	Defenses
Distillation enables IP leakage through black-box API	Rate limits, API monitoring
Market value of covert knowledge transfer is high	Require usage licenses for downstream models
Open-source vs proprietary tension intensifies global race	Regulatory guidelines on model derivation

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Case 4: Policy Puppetry: Universal Prompt Injection Bypass

1) Reported by HiddenLAYER Company.
2) They discovered attack strategies to bypass guardrails across major LLMs including **GPT-4**, **Claude**, **Gemini**, **Copilot**, **Llama**, **DeepSeek**, etc.
3) Enables system-level prompt and harmful content extraction.

[1] Novel Universal Bypass for All Major LLMs -- The Policy Puppetry Prompt Injection Technique: https://hiddenlayer.com/innovation-hub/novel-universal-bypass-for-all-major-llms/?utm_source=chatgpt.com#The-Policy-Puppetry-Attack

Case 4: Policy Puppetry: Universal Prompt Injection Bypass

Attack Mechanism: How Policy Puppetry Works?

Technique:

Craft malicious prompt formatted as policy file (e.g., XML, JSON)

Effect:

1) Overrides model's refusal blocks & alignment.

2) Works across different architectures and instruction hierarchies.

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Part 5: Case Studies & Real-World Scenarios

Case 4: Policy Puppetry: Universal Prompt Injection Bypass

Attack Effectiveness.

Provider	Model	Effective
OpenAI	ChatGPT 4o-mini	Yes
OpenAI	ChatGPT 4o	Yes
OpenAI	ChatGPT 4.5 Preview	Yes
OpenAI	ChatGPT 4.1	Yes
OpenAI	ChatGPT o1	Yes (with minor adjustments)
OpenAI	ChatGPT o3-mini	Yes (with minor adjustments)
Anthropic	Claude 3.5 Sonnet	Yes
Anthropic	Claude 3.7 Sonnet	Yes
Google	Gemini 1.5 Flash	Yes
Google	Gemini 2.0 Flash	Yes
Google	Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview	Yes (with minor adjustments)
Microsoft	Copilot	Yes
Meta	Llama 3.1 70B Instruct Turbo	Yes
Meta	Llama 3.1 405B Instruct Turbo	Yes
Meta	Llama 3.3 70B Instruct Turbo	Yes
Meta	Llama 4 Scout 17B 16E Instruct	Yes
Meta	Llama 4 Maverick 17B 128E Instruct FP8	Yes
DeepSeek	DeepSeek V3	Yes
DeepSeek	DeepSeek R1	Yes
Qwen	Qwen2.5 72B	Yes
Mistral AI	Mixtral 8x22B	Yes

Demonstrated Impact.

1) Elicit harmful content: CBRN instructions, violence, self-harm.
2) Leak system prompts & internal instructions.
3) Works on agentic systems (with tool access).

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Case 4: Policy Puppetry: Universal Prompt Injection Bypass

Why it's So Dangerous?

- Model-agnostic: A single prompt works on GPT, Claude, Copilot, Llama, DeepSeek, Qwen, etc.
- Hard to patch: Rooted in training data; RLHF alone ineffective.
- Scale of threat: Zero-day when developed to consumer apps.



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Case 4: Policy Puppetry -- Universal Prompt Injection Bypass

Key Takeaways & Mitigations

Defense	Explanation
Layered Monitoring	Real-time detection of policy-style prompts
Limit Agent Privileges	Avoid unrestricted tool access & minimize context scope
Automated Red-Teaming	Use universal bypass prompts in testing
Incident Playbooks	Prepare responses for jailbreak events

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Part 6: Future Directions & Discussions

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SECTION OVERVIEW.

1) Challenges in LLM Attack.

2) Challenges in LLM Defense.

3) Roadmap for advancing secure and robust LLMs.

Challenges in LLM Attack

Limited Model Access & High Cost.

Research gap:

Most attacks in literature use unrealistic unlimited-query assumptions.

(1) Closed-source Models, Expensive APIs

(2) Unrealistic Unlimited-Query Assumptions

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

(2) Unrealistic Unlimited-Query Assumptions

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

(2) Unrealistic Unlimited-Query Assumptions

Future Directions:

Develop query-efficient, stealthy extraction strategies.

Part 6: Future Directions & Discussions

Challenges in LLM Attack

Attack Specificity & Lack of Generalization.

Research Gaps:

1) Most extraction attacks exploit isolated model features (e.g., output tokens, logits).
2) Attacks rarely scale across architectures or tasks.
3) Few studies address **adaptive** or **multi-pronged** extraction.



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3) Few studies address **adaptive** or **multi-pronged** extraction.

Future Directions:

Combine diverse attack vectors to defeat adaptive defenses.

Challenges in LLM Attack

Stealth vs. Effectiveness Trade-off.

Research Gaps:

1) High-fidelity extraction needs massive queries—risks detection and cost escalation.
2) Stealthier attacks often reduce extraction quality.
3) Balancing cost, risk, and model fidelity remains unsolved.

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Future Directions:

Leverage active learning, reinforcement learning for optimal query planning.

Challenges in LLM Defense

Current Defense Limitations.

1) Structural defenses (e.g., model watermarking, API filtering) are hard to deploy on production models.
2) Output randomization harms utility/accuracy.
3) Most defenses lack formal guarantees; mostly evaluated empirically.

Challenges in LLM Defense

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Future Direction:

Research plug-and-play defenses for black-box models

Challenges in LLM Defense

Cat-and-Mouse: Arms Race Continues.

Research Gaps:

1) Adaptive attackers quickly bypass static defenses.
2) Defenses based on output manipulation can often be reverse-engineered.

Challenges in LLM Defense

Cat-and-Mouse: Arms Race Continues.

Research Gaps:

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Future Direction:

Defenses must anticipate adversarial adaptation.

Challenges in LLM Defense

Need of Formal Security Guarantees.

Research Gaps:

1) Most current evaluations are empirical; few offer theoretical security.
2) No standardized benchmarks or threat metrics.

Challenges in LLM Defense

Need of Formal Security Guarantees.

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Future Directions:

1) Develop provable defenses (cryptographic, information-theoretic).
2) Draw on work from differential privacy, watermarking, and robust learning.

Challenges in LLM Defense

Defense Applicability & Usability Gaps.

Research Gaps:

1) Most defenses require access to model internals or retraining.
2) Few methods can retrofit existing deployed APIs.
3) Defenses must not hurt model performance or UX.

Challenges in LLM Defense

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Research Gaps:

1) Most defenses require access to model internals or retraining.
2) Few methods can retrofit existing deployed APIs.
3) Defenses must not hurt model performance or UX.

Future Directions:

Focus on post-deployment, non-invasive methods.

Roadmap for advancing secure and robust LLMs

Expanding Threat & Evaluation Scenarios.

Research Gaps:

1) Most research focuses on QA/classification; other tasks (code, multi-modal, agentic) are underexplored
2) Extraction in federated, on-device, and collaborative LLMs?

Roadmap for advancing secure and robust LLMs

Expanding Threat & Evaluation Scenarios.

Research Gaps:

1) Most research focuses on QA/classification; other tasks (code, multi-modal, agentic) are underexplored
2) Extraction in federated, on-device, and collaborative LLMs?

Future Directions:

Build diverse, realistic benchmarks & red-teaming scenarios.

Roadmap for advancing secure and robust LLMs

Vision for Robust LLM Ecosystem.

Long-term Vision: Secure and Trustworthy LLMs

1) Industry–academia collaboration for shared threat intelligence.
2) Regulation and best practices for LLM APIs.
3) Red-teaming, open benchmarks, and public reporting.

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Future Direction:

Ongoing research is critical for future-proof LLMs.

Part 6: Future Directions & Discussions

Thank you for listening!

Q & A

We welcome your questions!